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While Google is known primarily as a search engine, it has increasingly 
developed and promoted its own content as an alternative to results from other 
websites. By prominently displaying Google content in response to search 
queries, Google is able to use its dominance in search to gain customers for this 
content. This may reduce consumer welfare if the internal content is inferior to 
organic search results. In this paper, we provide a legal and empirical analysis of 
this practice in the domain of online reviews. We first identify the conditions 
under which universal search would be considered anticompetitive. We then 
empirically investigate the impact of this practice on consumer welfare. To 
investigate, we implement a randomized controlled trial in which we vary the 
search results that subjects are shown - comparing Google’s current policy of 
favorable treatment of Google content to results in which external content is 
displayed. We find that users are roughly 40% more likely to engage with 
universal search results (which receive favored placement) when the results are 
organically determined relative to when they contain only Google content. To 
shed further light on the underlying mechanisms, we show that users are more 
likely to engage with the OneBox when there are more reviews, holding content 
constant. This suggests that Google is reducing consumer welfare by excluding 
reviews from other platforms in the OneBox. 
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1. Introduction 
Google is the world’s dominant search engine, accounting for roughly two-
thirds of US searches and more than 90% of searches in parts of the world, far 
exceeding competitors such as Bing and Yahoo (comScore qSearchTM Analysis 
2014). With a market capitalization of roughly $350 billion, Google is also among 
the most valuable companies in the world. In 2006, “Google” even became a 
verb in the Oxford English Dictionary, meaning to search for something on the 
web (Google Operating System Blog 2006).  
In an effort to expand its downstream product offering, Google has begun 
to develop its own content over time, such as its own price results for shopping 
and its own reviews for local businesses. In these situations, Google is acting 
both as a search engine and a content provider. Google shopping competes with 
Amazon; Google reviews compete with TripAdvisor. To use its search dominance 
to promote this content, Google has developed a feature called “universal 
search,” through which it blends specialized search properties - often from 
proprietary databases - in priority over the results generated by an organic, or 
algorithmic search. Universal search intentionally excludes content competitors 
and only shows Google’s content. For example, Google places and reviews may 
substitute for content from other specialized search platforms such as 
TripAdvisor and Yelp.  
Should this raise concerns from competition authorities? From a legal 
perspective, exclusionary self-dealing is a classic concern of both American and 
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European competition law, for it can form part of a campaign to maintain or 
acquire monopoly power.  A key question is whether the conduct is justified by 
procompetitive justifications: namely, the creation of a better product.   In the 
context of universal search, the key empirical question, then, is whether the 
conduct improves or degrades the product, and more broadly, whether 
consumers are benefited or harmed.  
We propose the use of randomized controlled trials to identify whether 
Google’s favorable treatment of Google content increases or decreases 
consumer welfare. Specifically, we implement an experiment in which we vary 
the search results that users are shown - comparing Google’s current policy of 
favorable treatment of Google content to results in which external content is 
displayed. Through a series of online experiments, we provide a case study of a 
situation in which Google is systemically making its overall product worse for 
users in order to provide favorable treatment to Google content. To populate the 
treatment group, we use content selected by Google’s own organic algorithm.  
We begin with a simple thought experiment. Suppose you are planning a 
trip to Louisville, Kentucky and are searching for a coffee shop through Google. 
Clearly, there is a wide variety of content that might facilitate this search. 
Competing ratings and reviews ranging from Yelp to TripAdvisor to Food & Wine 
invest heavily in developing such content. In this situation, Google’s content may 
be more or less useful to users than other content. If Google provides favorable 
placement to Google content in a world in which Food & Wine is – on average - 
more useful, then this creates harm to consumers.   
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 “Local intent”-based searches (including areas such as coffees shops, 
doctors, and mechanics) comprise the largest single category of search behavior. 
Google currently presents users with local search results that are a mixture of its 
organic results along with a user interface object known as the “Local OneBox.” 
The OneBox typically includes a list of seven business pins populated by 
exclusively querying Google’s proprietary local product, Google+ Local; this set 
of seven business pins is attached to a Google Map. However, Google’s organic 
search employs a merit-based algorithm that can easily be used to identify better 
candidates to populate its local search boxes, enabling the creation of an 
alternative version of the search engine results page.  
Exploiting these institutional features of Google, we construct two sets of 
results for searches for coffee shops in different markets. In the control group, we 
display Google’s actual results. In this situation, the OneBox contains Google 
content. In the treatment group, we display the exact same organic content below 
the OneBox. However, instead of filling the OneBox with only Google content, we 
fill the OneBox with listings and reviews from the content providers that Google’s 
algorithm organically isolates (Yelp, TripAdvisor, etc.). We construct these 
alternative results through a browser plug-in called “Focus on the User - Local” 
(FOTU), which has queried third-party review sites and ranked them, using 
Google's own organic algorithm, according to which site delivers the most 
relevant information for the content in question. 
If Google’s placement of its own content in the OneBox makes users 
better off, then we should expect users to engage with the OneBox more often 
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with Google content than with organic content offered by Google’s algorithm. In 
contrast, if users are less likely to engage with the OneBox when it is filled with 
Google content, this suggests that Google is creating harm by tying its own 
content through the OneBox.  
We then task subjects on UsabilityHub with searching for a local coffee 
shop, and compare the performance across these two sets of results. We find 
that users would be more likely to engage with local specialized search results if 
Google were to replace its proprietary results in universal search with results 
drawn from the web based on the same merit-based algorithm that it uses to 
populate organic search (as opposed to being exclusively drawn from Google+).  
  The results demonstrate that consumers prefer the second version 
of universal search. Stated differently, consumers prefer results scored by 
Google’s own organic search engine to the content currently developed for 
Google+ Local. This leads to the conclusion that Google is degrading its own 
search results by excluding its competitors at the expense of its users. The fact 
that Google’s own algorithm would provide better results suggests that Google is 
making a strategic choice to display their own content, rather than choosing 
results that consumers would prefer. The easy and widely disseminated 
argument that Google’s universal search always serves users and merchants is 
demonstrably false. In the largest category of search (local intent-based), Google 
appears to be strategically deploying universal search in a way that degrades the 
product so as to slow and exclude challengers to its dominant search paradigm.  
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The demonstration of consumer harm is an important conclusion standing 
on its own that should influence any competition law analysis. However, it 
intersects with several widely-recognized criteria for enforcement action in 
competition law. First, whatever the general utility of universal search, we have 
shown that, as implemented in some segments, universal search is harmful both 
to merchants, consumers and competitors while lacking redeeming qualities. As 
such, in some implementations it may be categorized as a species of “naked 
exclusion” – in other words, conduct that excludes competitors without any 
countervailing benefit (Rasmusen et al. 1991) 
Alternatively, Google’s conduct can be understood as the knowing neglect 
of a “less restrictive alternative” for achieving legitimate goals (Hemphill 2015). 
Google’s development of universal search, in general, can be accepted as an 
important innovation that can improve consumer welfare. But it seizes on the fact 
that, as implemented, Google appears to have chosen to do so in a way that 
neglects an obvious and clearly more effective alternative, resulting in harm to 
consumers, merchants, and its competitors. Important to this conclusion is 
evidence that Google is sacrificing a higher quality and potentially more profitable 
product in favor of a more exclusionary option. That fortifies the intuition that the 
conduct is suspect. 
Overall, our findings contribute to a growing literature on the economics of 
online platforms. Early work showed that the growth of the Internet and online 
search created consumer welfare gains ranging from lower prices of life 
insurance (Brown and Goolsbee 2002) to increased variety of books 
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(Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Smith 2003). Specialized search platforms such as Yelp, 
TripAdvisor, and Amazon provide vast amounts of user-generated content about 
goods and services. Online marketplaces such as TaskRabbit, Airbnb, and Uber 
create markets where none existed. These platforms have influenced markets 
ranging from restaurants and hotels to books to labor markets, through lower 
search costs and increased information flows.7  
Our results suggest that some of the welfare gains are lost due to 
Google’s market power and the practice of tying Google content to Google 
search results. Our findings also relate to the literature on market power in 
platforms. Hagiu and Julien (2011) develop a theoretical model of search 
diversion. Edelman and Lai (2015) empirically show that the introduction of 
Google’s preferential placement of its flight search tool crowded out visits to 
organic pages. Edelman (2015) provides the first legal analysis of Google’s 
practice of tying. We contribute to this literature by providing further legal analysis 
as well as empirical evidence of consumer harm from a randomized controlled 
trial.  
In addition to our contribution to the legal analysis of antitrust cases in this 
domain, our experimental approach provides a new tool for regulators who are 
seeking to better understand consumer preferences and harm in the online 
world. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to incorporate the use 
of randomized controlled trials into an antitrust analysis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  See	  Chevalier	  and	  Mayzlin	  2006,	  Luca	  2011,	  Ghose	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  al	  2012,	  and	  Einav	  et	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  evidence	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2. Background on Online Search and OneBox 
The Internet, with more than 4.7 billion linked pages, contains more 
information than any one user could read in a lifetime. Because this content is 
extremely decentralized, users frequently begin their quests for online 
information through search engines such as Google, Bing, and Yahoo. Users 
enter a word, number, or phrase, and the search engine will return a large list of 
webpages that the user may want to click on. For example, a Google search for 
“restaurants near me” yields roughly 443 million results.  
Because there is so much information to sift through, tools for finding 
information on the web have always had an important influence on nearly all 
aspects of economic activity and innovation on the web and its connection to 
“Main Street” small businesses. The ability of buyers and sellers to connect 
determines which businesses succeed and which fail, what innovations catch on, 
and which flounder. They also have a preeminent role in influencing the speech 
environment centered on the web.  
The central task of search engines is to choose the order in which to list 
results. The history of search engines is one of technological evolution. In the 
early days of the World Wide Web, simple lists of links and directory services 
(like the early Yahoo!) were used, in competition with early, primitive search 
engines. Eventually, in the early 2000s, the “general” search engine (which 
searches the entire web) became the tool of choice; Google is the preeminent 
example. General search, today, remains a dominant tool by which web sites and 
their users find each other, and buyers and sellers are matched. 
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General search engines now use an algorithm that determines which 
results are most likely to be clicked and orders them based on the percent of 
people who clicked on that result, along with other factors. This approach relies 
on the revealed preference of users. Developing high quality search results has 
been the core objective of search engines.  
The evolution of the web’s information retrieval tools did not end with 
general search. From around 2000—2014, just as Google’s general search 
replaced directory services, its general search began to face its own challengers. 
The most important challenge has come from specialized search; that is, search 
engines that deliver information based not on searching the entire web, but rather 
a specific category of information. Prominent examples include the search for 
books on Amazon, plane tickets on Kayak or Orbitz, hotel reviews on 
TripAdvisor, or for a local doctor on Yelp or ZocDoc. As it stands, specialized 
search is not in direct competition to Google; instead, it represents a threat to the 
general search paradigm (in the sense that Netscape, in combination with other 
middleware were a paradigm threat to the Windows OS paradigm). Eric Schmidt 
captured this reality when he recently suggested “our biggest search competitor 
is Amazon.” 
Google has, over the decade, fought the threat from specialized search in 
the following ways. First, beginning in the 2010s, it made copies of the most 
successful of the specialized search engines. Many of these are essentially 
clones of competitors, like Kayak or Yelp (yielding, for example, “Google travel” 
“Google shopping,” “Google+ Local,” etc.). Earlier versions of Google’s clones 
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also used data from the originals; for example, early versions of Google local 
took the reviews collected by Yelp and TripAdvisor and incorporated them into 
Google’s product. 
Some of these products – such as Google Maps – have gained traction 
and become dominant over time, in part due to excellent engineering and 
superior product design. Others have not proved as popular with users as the 
originals. Many of these clones suffer from poor search rankings in Google's 
organic search results.  
To improve the popularity of its specialized search features, Google has 
used the power of its dominant general search engine. The primary means for 
doing so is what is called the “universal search” or the “OneBox.” Universal 
search operates by incorporating the general (“ten blue links”) and specialized 
(“OneBox”) search paradigms into the same user interface on the search engine 
results page. Google deploys the OneBox when it detects keywords that indicate 
that the user is performing a specialized search. The OneBox is one of several 
Google products that has given rise to antitrust concerns, and is the focus of this 
paper.  
A search for “restaurants San Francisco” might trigger Yelp as the first 
natural result. Google deploys a Local OneBox above the natural results. The 
OneBox, with a few exceptions, is populated by Google’s own versions of its 
competitors’ specialized search services (e.g., Google+ Local or travel). Figures 
1 and 2 provide sample screenshots of universal search results.  
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3. Legal Assessments of Universal Search 
Universal search, in its operation is inherently exclusionary, for it uses the 
dominant general search engine to divert traffic from Google’s specialized 
competitors (Expedia, Yelp, etc.) to its own versions of those companies. That 
fact has led to scrutiny both by European and American competition regulators. 
Google’s strategy follows a well-known historic pattern. Technological 
monopolists, facing threats from innovative competitors, often engage in vertical 
self-dealing to protect their monopoly. A prominent example was the defensive 
self-dealing by the American phone monopolist AT&T, which led to prolonged 
litigation over the 1970s and 80s, where AT&T was accused of excluding both 
handset and long-distance competitors, despite federal regulations requiring 
interconnection. Another historical parallel can be seen in the US and European 
Microsoft litigation of the 1990s, where Microsoft was accused of using the power 
of its operating system monopoly to exclude various competitors in favor of its 
own versions of their products. The most prominent victim of that conduct was 
Netscape.  
According to Google, a principal difference between the earlier cases and 
its current conduct is that universal search represents a pro-competitive, user-
serving innovation. By deploying universal search, Google argues, it has made 
search better. As Eric Schmidt argues, “if we know the answer it is better for us 
to answer that question so [the user] doesn’t have to click anywhere, and in that 
sense we … use data sources that are our own because we can’t engineer it any 
other way.” 
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Based on the facts available to them, the economic experts employed by 
Google and other academics have tended to assert, generally, that universal 
search serves consumer interests, a point this paper does not contest. For 
example, Michael A. Salinger and Robert J. Levinson, Google’s economic 
consultants, describe universal search as an important innovation, a point with 
which we take no disagreement. “[T]here can be little doubt that answering 
questions directly benefits consumers… The introduction of Universals, which 
required Google to refine its (probabilistic) assessment of the intent behind a 
search and then provide a link to the best available information for that intent 
regardless of its form, was an important intermediate step toward the ultimate 
goal of providing information directly.” Similarly, Robert Bork and Greg Sidak, in 
What does the Chicago School Teach about Internet Search, argue that 
universal search is “a product improvement that consumers value.” They add, 
using a one-monopoly profit theorem, that Google has no particular reason to 
want to extend its market power into specialized search. 
The assertions made by Salinger, Levinson, Bork and Sidak do not really 
address the degradation described in this paper. No one truly disagrees that 
universal search, in concept, can be an important innovation that can serve 
consumers. The more challenging question arises not from the deployment of 
universal search to tell people the weather, but its intentional degradation for 
exclusionary in areas where Google faces the most serious long-term 
competition. 
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In this respect, the most in-depth analysis of exactly the dilemma 
presented by universal search was presented by James D. Ratliff & Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld. Ratliff & Rubinfeld describe the possibility that third-party content 
might be better, or more relevant, than Google’s own affiliated content, presented 
by universal. In that case, the authors suggest, “Google faces a tradeoff. If 
Google listed the less relevant Google-affiliated website more prominently, 
Google would benefit from the greater ‘free publicity’ that website would receive. 
Conversely, choosing the less relevant Google-affiliated website to display more 
prominently would, by assumption, lower the relevance of the organic search 
results. This effect, if non-negligible, could cause the user to have a poorer 
search experience compared with one in which the more relevant link was listed 
more prominently.” 
Having captured the search degradation potential presented by universal 
search, however, the authors, working mainly by assumption, assert that the 
degradation will not happen. In short, they theorize that any degradation caused 
by preferential treatment of Google’s own properties would be noticed by users, 
causing a switch to competing search engines, general or specialized. Hence, 
the authors conclude, Google will always be incentivized to do what is best for 
users, and should, by their assumptions, always choose third-party sites when 
that is good for users. As they state, Google “would be more likely to more 
prominently display the more-relevant website (not affiliated with Google) the 
greater the relevance advantage of the non-Google website and the lower the 
beneficial effect of the enhanced free publicity on Google’s affiliated business.” 
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As detailed below, the underlying experiment directly contradicts these 
assertions, suggesting that that the authors have come close to assuming away 
the problem. Among various implicit assumptions, they assume that users have 
perfect knowledge of the quality of the search they are using, and would suffer 
relatively little switching costs in abandoning Google for some constellation of 
alternatives. They essentially assume that whenever Google chooses its own 
properties it does so because its own properties are better than those provided 
by third parties. 
That latter assertion is contradicted by Google’s PageRank itself, which 
consistently ranks Google’s products below those offered by third parties. More 
generally the fact, demonstrated here, that Google does exactly what Ratliff and 
Rubinfeld describe — offer a degraded search product that ignores more relevant 
alternatives, strongly suggests that something is wrong with the Ratliff and 
Rubinfeld analysis. Among other things, Ratliff and Rubin fail to take into 
consideration Google’s interest in the exclusion and weakening of long-term, 
paradigmatic competitors. That additional factor, we theorize, may justify, for the 
firm, the degradation of the search product in some areas, where it faces 
dangerous nascent competitors. The premise is that Google can afford to 
degrade its search in some areas while retaining top quality searches in others, 
without notably losing users or market share. 
 Support for this theory comes from Google’s pattern in its deployment of 
non-affiliated content. In areas where Google does not face a serious specialized 
search competitor, like general knowledge questions, or health questions, 
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Google relies on the best third party sites as revealed by PageRank (sites like 
Wikipedia or the Mayo Clinic). It is only where it faces a specialized competitor 
that Google engages in degradation of the search as described here. That 
suggests the factor missing from Ratliff and Rubin’s analysis is the interests of 
Google in weakening its nascent competitors, which may be a real interest, but 
not a pro-competitive interest. 
Randy Picker makes this point more explicit when he notes that a media 
monopolist that depends on advertising as opposed to cash payments need 
always degrade the product (by adding ads) to make its profit. As Picker points 
out, the important question, from a competition perspective, is what form the 
degradation takes. As he writes: 
“For the zero-cash-price media monopolist, the exercise of market power 
is just about product degradation. … [Y]ou take the product that you would 
otherwise sell to consumers and make it worse in consumer eyes by adding 
advertising. You do that to make money.” 
“We should expect media monopolists to degrade their products and the 
only issue is precisely how they do that. Degrading the product to make money 
today through ads is … a legitimate use of market power. But degrading the 
quality of the product to maintain that monopoly or to extend it to a new setting is 
an illegitimate use of market power. 
Much of the other academic writing in this area concerns the question of 
market power in search — a question important to a full competition law analysis 
but one beyond the scope of this paper (see, for example, Denegri-Knott et al. 
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(2006)). Without dwelling on the topic, we make just one point. The ability of 
Google to profitably degrade its search in some areas, as suggested by the 
results here, has natural empirical relevance to the firm’s possession of market 
power. Indeed, it might be taken as direct evidence of market power,8 though we 
do not fully develop the point here. 
 The ability to offer a degraded product without losing consumers is 
relevant, for example, to the argument that Google does not have market power 
because of an absence of switching costs; Professors Aaron Edlin and Robert 
Harris, among others, make the argument that switching costs are “trivial” in 
search markets, and suggest that this greatly constrains Google’s power (Edlin 
and Harris 2013). In purely competitive market, without switching costs, it would 
seem to be impossible for Google to sustain a degraded search without 
immediately losing its users to competitors. The apparent ability of Google to 
maintain a degraded search product in at least some areas may suggest users 
will not immediately switch even if the search is selectively degraded, suggesting 
that there may be something wrong with the Edlin and Harris theory.  
A final assessment of the universal search product came from the Federal 
Trade Commission, both in it is statement closing its investigation, and the 
remarks of Chairman Jon Leibovitz. The FTC, in its closing of the case, stated, 
based on the evidence it had, that “the documents, testimony and quantitative 
evidence the Commission examined are largely consistent with the conclusion 
that Google likely benefited consumers by prominently displaying its vertical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  As	  in	  the	  Toys	  R’	  Us	  case	  in	  the	  Seventh	  Circuit	  Court	  of	  Appeals.	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content on its search results page.” In his statement, based on the evidence then 
available to the Commission, Lebovitz wrote “We close that investigation, finding 
that the evidence does not support a claim that Google’s prominent display of its 
own content on its general search page was undertaken without legitimate 
justification … Google’s primary reason for changing the look and feel of its 
search results to highlight its own products was to improve the user experience.” 
While the full scope of the evidence reviewed is not public, it is evident that the 
Commission did not have the benefit of randomized controlled trials when it 
offered that conclusion in 2013 The goal of this paper is to test, whether in fact 
the user experience has been improved. As we stressed, in some areas, the 
results suggest the opposite. 
3.1 Theories of Harm 
Google creates economic welfare by reducing search frictions and 
matching users with the objects of their preferences. Users come to Google with 
preexisting preferences for goods and services (European soccer games, 
vinyasa yoga, New York-style bagels and so on.) They ultimately are matched 
with merchants and website operators who seek consumers (to simplify the 
analysis, we ignore advertisers, or assume that they are also among those 
seeking a match).  
Google serves as the “platform” or “intermediary” that matches buyers with 
sellers of desired goods or services. Search, stated more simply, generates utility 
when someone finds a yoga studio they decide to join, locates where to buy 
tickets to a soccer game, identifies a good pediatrician for their sick child, and so 
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on. In this manner, by matching buyers and sellers, search directly generates 
economic welfare. The flipside of understanding the utility of search is that a 
purposefully degraded search product can therefore do economic harm, 
particularly if it is widely relied upon. For completeness, we now consider five 
theories by which degrading of search creates harm to consumers and 
merchants. 
 Welfare Loss. We have described the utility of a search engine in terms of 
matching buyers and sellers and the reduction of search costs in that process. 
Ellison and Ellison (2009) demonstrate that firms can engage in obfuscation to 
make it harder for customers to acquire information in an attempt to maintain 
market power. We show that even the platform itself may have the incentive to 
increase search frictions for their own benefit. Because the resulting quality and 
volume of matches is worse when search frictions are increased, there is a drop 
in total welfare. This welfare loss is then split between consumers and 
merchants.  
 There are, to be more precise, several species of harm caused. First, 
some consumers may simply not find what they are looking for in the time they 
have, and will give up, yielding some number of unconsummated transactions. 
Second, some consumers will be, in fact, determined enough to eventually find 
their desired target, but simply suffer greater search costs in the process. A third 
kind of harm arises when a buyer ends up patronizing a business or other service 
provider who would not have been their first choice, but for the degrading of the 
search. Consider, for example, a consumer who is misdirected and ends up at a 
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bad restaurant; or the parents who are looking for a top-notch pediatrician, but 
because of search degradation, patronize a subpar practitioner. The harm 
caused by such misdirection when it occurs, will vary, but is undeniable in the 
aggregate. The point is simply that a degraded search engine will invariably, as 
compared to its alternative, yield some consumer harm from misdirection. 
Search-Advertising Monopoly Maintenance. Our results suggest that 
Google has chosen a path that excludes its specialized search competitors at the 
expense of its users. The result is to weaken nascent competitors to the general 
search paradigm. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to prove that 
Google’s dominance of search advertising allows it to charge supra-competitive 
prices for search-advertising, assuming it does, the exclusion of competitors 
likely sustains those elevated prices. Such conduct might be defensible if, as 
Google claims, its exclusionary conduct was justified by procompetitive benefits 
for consumers. However, as this paper has shown, Google’s implementation is in 
some areas actually harmful to consumers. As such, the maintenance of inflated 
prices constitutes a form of economic harm that the competition laws were 
designed to remedy. 
Innovation Harms. The pattern by which Google uses general search to 
exclude and harm competitors in specialized search poses several threats to 
innovation, of which two may be highlighted.  
It is important to note that most of the successful, pioneer specialized 
search operators earned their success through investment and innovation. Yelp 
made deep investments in the successful cultivation of offline communities, 
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which encouraged prolific creation of detailed reviews. Yelp also developed 
important technologies to weed out various forms of fraud and spam. Kayak 
developed new ways of presenting flight information and incorporated prediction 
algorithms that suggest the best time to buy a ticket. TripAdvisor succeeded 
where others had failed in achieving a critical mass of reviews of hotels and 
attractions for much of the globe.  
Harm to future innovation is caused by reducing the incentives of existing 
and potential verticals to invest in the innovative and disruptive technologies of 
specialized search. If it is understood by entrepreneurs and innovators that any 
firm that relies on a specialized search will face an effort by Google to clone its 
product and be used by the power of a dominant search engine, the shadow cast 
by Google’s search engine becomes long indeed. Just as Microsoft was able to 
dampen innovation in software that it might incorporate into Windows, so too 
Google can use the terror of linking specialized searches to general search to 
discourage investment in specialized search products that might ultimately 
challenge its dominance.  
Second, Google’s conduct may create harm by slowing the evolution of 
search technology. As we have seen, the history of the web has witnessed 
market-altering improvements in information location technology arising each 
decade or so (the rise of Yahoo!, Google, etc.). To the degree that universal 
search delays or preserves the general search paradigm over the rise of 
specialized search alternatives, it may be understood as the potential slowing or 
blockage of Schumpeterian “competition for the market” that has been a 
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trademark of the high-tech and internet industries for much of the last 40 years. 
The tendency may be particularly important in the mobile environment, where 
general search has been less-well established and presumably weaker than 
specialized search.  
The very introduction of universal search, as Google has highlighted, is 
itself a form of innovation. However, when considering welfare implications, 
everything (once again) depends on implementation. To the extent that universal 
search is implemented in a manner that benefits buyers and sellers its value 
cannot be contested. To the extent it is deployed to damage competitors at the 
expense of consumers, it represents no real innovation at all. 
Speech and Self-Expression. The World Wide Web has been celebrated 
over the last decade for its widespread promulgation of speech and other forms 
of self-expression captured in the phrase “user-generated content.” That phrase 
reflects in a multitude of forms ranging from blogs, user-created videos, reviews 
of films, products, or restaurants, and so on. More generally, Google operates in 
the information industries, where “the cost of monopoly must not be measured in 
dollars alone, but also in its effect on the economy of ideas and image, the 
restraint of which can amount to censorship” (Wu, 2011). 
Search engines are widely understood as key mediators of the web’s 
speech environment, given that they have a powerful impact on who gets heard, 
what speech is neglected, and what information generally is reached. It is telling 
that in censorial regimes, search engines are invariably the targets of strict 
government controls (Goldsmith and Wu 2006). As professor Jeffrey Rosen has 
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written, Google has a particularly central role in this process (Rosen 2012) 
Search engines like Google have substantial influence to the point that 
“[u]nderstanding free speech in America has become a matter of understanding 
the behavior of intermediaries, whether motivated by their own scruples, law, or 
public pressure” (Wu 2010; see also Rosen 2008). 
The decisions made about search, and in particular, the decision to self-
deal at the expense of other entities on the web, have implications both for web 
“speakers” and also listeners, or users. The more that Google directs users to its 
own content and its own properties, the more that speakers who write reviews, 
blogs and other materials become invisible to their desired audiences. Similarly, 
those users who might want to sample a broader, more diverse range of opinions 
will, unless they undertake more efforts, find themselves with a more constrained 
range of views. This fits with the general implications of vertical integration in an 
information industry – that self-dealing tends to yield a more centralized and 
narrow availability of views as compared to the broader and decentralized 
presentation of viewpoints that has characterized the web since its infancy. 
4. Experimental Design 
4.1 Focus on the User Plug-In 
 
Our main treatment uses data from a Chrome Browser Extension called 
Focus on the User – Local (FOTU), which was designed to detect Local 
OneBoxes and perform alternative searches for results from online review 
websites. Upon detecting a Local OneBox in Google search results, FOTU 
conducted a search for links to third party local review websites (such as Yelp, 
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TripAdvisor, and ZocDoc). FOTU then extracted and ranked results from these 
websites (as well as from Google’s review content), according to a combination 
of Google’s organic ranking, the business’s average star rating, and the number 
of reviews.  
FOTU essentially constructed an alternative method of presenting local 
results, based on the algorithm that powers Google organic search. Note that 
maintaining a plug-in such as FOTU in an ongoing basis would be challenging 
because Google search result pages, local content, and domains change often. 
In fact, the content has changed even since this version of this plug-in was 
created, preventing this from being adopted by users. However, for the purpose 
of this research, we extracted these ordered lists for our key search, which we 
incorporate into our treatment group below. 
4.2 Treatments 
We create three experimental conditions, described below. 
4.2.1 Control  
To create a control condition, we captured a screenshot of results for 
searches for the phrase “coffee Louisville KY”. Throughout the experiment, this 
was used as a control display. Figure 3 shows the screenshot. 
4.2.2 FOTU  
 This treatment is identical to the control except for the content of the 
OneBox. Instead of containing Google content, the OneBox presents content 
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from FOTU. By comparing the control to this treatment, we can explore 
consumer preferences across the two sets of content. 
4.2.3 No Reviews 
This treatment is identical to the control except for the content of the 
OneBox. The OneBox contains the same Google content as the control, except 
we removed the rating and review counts next to the businesses (which are 
contained in the control). This will allow us to identify the mediating role of 
reviews in the comparison between Google content and FOTU. 
4.2.4 Experimental Tasks 
 With treatment groups in hand, we ran two sets of experiments. In the first, 
we randomized subjects into one of the three conditions above. Users were then 
asked where they would click if conducting the specified search.  One possible 
concern with this is that clicks may not necessarily measure preferences. To 
confirm our interpretation, we run a survey in which we show two sets of results 
and ask them which they would use.  
4.3 Subjects and Experimental Platform 
We run our experiment on UsabilityHub, which is a testing platform used 
by companies that are interested in testing different designs of their webpages. 
Our subject pool consists of 2,170 users from Amazon Mechanical Turk, which is 
an online labor market and common platform used for social science 
experiments. UsabilityHub provides a useful platform for experimentally testing 
different search features, since it is the same platform that multiple consumer 
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Internet companies actually use for this type of task. We replicate our results on 
a sample of 120 subjects in the HBS laboratory to reinforce the validity of the 
Mechanical Turk findings. 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 User Preferences for FOTU 
Figure 4 presents the main results. In the control condition, 48% of users 
clicked inside of the OneBox. In contrast, 66% of users clicked inside of the 
OneBox when it was filled with FOTU content. In other words, users are roughly 
40% more likely to engage with the OneBox when it is filled with FOTU content/ 
using Google’s own algorithm.  
User clicks are a widely accepted measure of consumer preferences. For 
example, may advertising systems – including Google’s – are optimized based 
on the likelihood of clicking on a link. Nonetheless, one might be concerned that 
user clicks may not necessarily reveal their preferences.  
To address this concern, we run a simple second survey experiment in 
which we show a separate set of users both conditions, and ask which they 
prefer. Rather than eliciting search behavior, we are instead directly asking which 
page users think is preferable. Per figure 5, roughly 70-80% of users prefer 
FOTU in a head-to-head comparison, reinforcing our interpretation that clicks are 
a reasonable measure of user preferences in this context.  
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5.2 The Role of Reviews 
 
Our main result shows that users prefer FOTU content, but does not 
explain the mechanism. Our hypothesis is that users prefer FOTU content 
because it contains more reviews than the control (464 relative to 117). By 
construction, FOTU must always have more reviews, since it pulls data from 
reviews platforms and Google reviews, whereas the Google OneBox intentionally 
excludes other review platforms.  
To test this hypothesis, we run a second set of experiments in which we 
show the identical content, but vary the number of reviews shown next to each 
business (117 relative to 0). In figure 4, we show that only 33% of users click on 
the OneBox when it contains no reviews, relative to 48% when it contains 117 
reviews – even though all other content is identical. In other words, users are 
roughly 46% more likely to engage with the OneBox when it contains reviews 
relative to when it doesn’t, holding all else constant. To support our interpretation, 
we again run a head-to-head comparison in which a different set of subjects is 
asked to choose between the two sets of content. Figure 6 shows that users 
overwhelmingly prefer the content that contains reviews relative to the content 
that does not. 
Overall, these findings show that users prefer FOTU content to Google 
content, and that this is mediated by the fact that FOTU contains more reviews. 
By intentionally excluding reviews from other platforms, Google is hence 
degrading the quality of its product. 
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5.3 Cross-Validating Subject Responses 
While our experimental approach is new to antitrust analysis, randomized 
controlled trials form the backbone of much of the social sciences and are 
becoming an increasingly important policy tool. Experiments are also an 
important approach used when designing online platforms – in fact, this is one 
frequent use of UsabilityHub.  
Because this is a new approach to this context, we cross-validate our 
results by comparing behavior on UsabilityHub to known behavior in online 
platforms. Optimally, we would compare our results to results from experiments 
done within Google. However, we do not have access to their data since it is 
proprietary. Instead, we ran a separate experiment within Yelp and the exact 
same experiment on UsabilityHub. 
Specifically, we ran an experiment in which a control group was shown a 
Yelp search page without any filters and a treatment group was shown a Yelp 
search page with filters – as shown in Figure 7. We then measured the percent of 
users who engaged with the map on the page.  We ran this both on UsabilityHub 
and in vivo on Yelp. We found that users were 22% more likely to engage with 
the map in the treatment condition on Yelp, and 29% more likely to engage with 
the treatment condition on UsabilityHub. The qualitative consistency of results 
across these platforms provides further support for the validity of our 
experimental approach. 
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5.4 Robustness Check: Evidence From the Experimental Laboratory 
Our main sample of subjects comes from Mechanical Turk, which is an 
increasingly common subject pool within the social sciences. Horton et al 2011 
provides evidence that online experiments yield similar estimates to those in the 
lab. Nonetheless, one might put more faith in traditional subject pools from 
experimental laboratories. To reinforce our main findings, we replicate the test 
from section Figure 4 in a 120-subject experiment in the Harvard Business 
School laboratory. We find that users are roughly 21 percentage points less likely 
to click inside the box when the box is filled with Google content, relative to 
content from FOTU, reinforcing our main findings.  
 
6 Legal Criteria of Actionable Exclusion 
 A demonstration of consumer harm is relevant to nearly any competition 
law theory one might care to invoke. We therefore think the conclusion that 
Google is knowingly degrading its search at the expense of consumers stands on 
its own as a crucial fact. Here, we here develop three ways of thinking about 
whether an enforcement authority should take action.  
6.1 Naked Exclusion, Neglect of Less Restrictive Alternatives & 
Sacrifice of Product Quality 
 
The oft-stated goal of the antitrust and competition laws is the protection 
of the competitive process.  In pursuit of that goal, most of the major legal 
systems have adopted a framework that seeks to balance the anticompetitive 
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harms claimed by the plaintiff against whatever efficiencies or “procompetitive 
justifications” might be raised by the defendant.   Such an analysis is 
characteristic of “rule of reason” analysis under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
and also the analysis of exclusionary conduct under Section 2.  It is also a 
feature of the analysis under both Para 101 and 102 of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union.  
A typical formulation of the approach is presented by the Court of Appeals 
decision in seminal case of United States v. Microsoft. The court was considering 
monopolist conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.   “To be condemned as 
exclusionary,” the court explained “a monopolist's act must have an 
‘anticompetitive effect.’”   However, “if a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima 
facie case under S. 2 by demonstrating anticompetitive effect, then the 
monopolist may proffer a ‘procompetitive justification’ for its conduct. If the 
monopolist asserts a procompetitive justification--a nonpretextual claim that its 
conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits because it involves, for 
example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal--then the burden 
shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut that claim. … [I]f the monopolist's 
procompetitive justification stands unrebutted, then the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive 
benefit." 
This formulation makes the questions of anticompetitive effects and 
procompetitive justification central to nearly any competition case.   However, it 
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also presents the judge with a difficult question.  When should conduct that 
excludes competitors be excused by virtue of the fact that it may also be efficient 
or beneficial for consumers? How exactly should “pro-competitive” efficiencies be 
weighed against anti-competitive exclusion? This particular problem shows up 
with great frequency in cases arising under Section 2 of the Sherman Act or Para 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (see Sherman 
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §2 (2000); see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty of 
the Functioning of the European Union, art. 102, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 
326) 47). 
American judges have been particularly sensitive to the dangers of the 
“false positive” – that is to say, condemnation of practices that might, on balance, 
be good for consumers or the economy. As the American Supreme Court has 
stressed, to condemn exclusionary conduct that is pro-competitive might “chill the 
very conduct that the antitrust laws are designed to protect.” Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 575 (1986). 9 The European 
Commission is also wary of this concern, and allows the justification of conduct 
“leading to foreclosure of competitors on the ground of efficiencies that are 
sufficient to guarantee that no net harm to consumers is likely to arise.” 
Commission Decision No. 92/213/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 96) 34 (EC).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  The	  challenge	  is	  augmented	  in	  software	  or	  technologies	  cases	  where	  exclusion	  is	  often	  
accomplished	  by	  product	  design,	  for	  competition	  authorities	  have	  sometimes	  been	  inclined	  to	  defer	  
to	  the	  designer.	  In	  the	  American	  Microsoft	  case,	  for	  example,	  the	  court	  pointed	  out	  that	  “In	  a	  
competitive	  market,	  firms	  routinely	  innovate	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  appealing	  to	  consumers,	  sometimes	  in	  
the	  process	  making	  their	  products	  incompatible	  for	  those	  of	  rivals;	  the	  imposition	  of	  liability	  when	  a	  
monopolist	  does	  the	  same	  thing	  will	  inevitably	  deter	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  innovation.”	  United	  States	  v.	  
Microsoft	  Corp.,	  253	  F.3d	  34,	  65	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  2001).	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There is no simple answer to how a court should weigh anticompetitive 
exclusionary effects against procompetitive benefits.   However, courts and 
commentators have isolated scenarios where action in cases of exclusion is most 
clearly warranted. We consider three here: “naked exclusion,” “neglect of less 
restrictive alternatives” and “sacrifice of product quality.” 
The first is the category of “naked exclusion,” where the exclusion of 
competitors is simply not justified by any real efficiencies or benefits for 
consumers (even if they may be claimed.). As Susan Creighton defines the term, 
it is such conduct is that which “is likely … to have only anticompetitive effects.” 
(Creighton 2005). Among many classic examples is the Lorain Journal case, 
where a newspaper refused to print advertisements from companies that 
patronized its rivals, or Allied Tube10, where the makers of a form of steel pipe 
conspired to prevent plastic pipes from being accepted by a standards body. 
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Allied Tube and 
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1998). 
 The second category is one where a dominant firm forgoes an obvious, 
less restrictive alternative course of conduct that would be equally, or more 
effective in serving the pro-competitive goals articulated. The reliance on a less-
restrictive alternative analysis, as commentators point out, serves several 
purposes. For one thing, it serves as an aid to the balancing of pro-competitive 
efficiencies with the harms of exclusion. As Herbert Hovenkamp has written, 
given complex balancing, “first and foremost, the antitrust decision-maker must 
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look for less restrictive alternatives.” (Hovenkamp and Areeda 2005). Second, as 
Scott Hemphill points out, the use of less restrictive alternatives may also serve 
as important tool for “smoking-out” an illicit motive (Hemphill 2015). 
In European practice, an “indispensability” analysis mirrors the American 
“less restrictive alternatives” jurisprudence. As the Commission has written, a 
firm that offers a pro-competitive efficiency must show that “its conduct is 
indispensable to the realization of those efficiencies: there must be no less 
anticompetitive alternatives to the conduct that are capable of producing the 
same efficiencies.” Commission Decision Id.  
 The indispensability or less-restrictive alternatives analysis aims to identify 
the following situation. Consider a dominant firm who claims that its exclusionary 
practices serve a laudable, pro-competitive goal. It faces two equally effective 
strategies for doing so: strategy A and B, but strategy A is more exclusionary of 
its competitors. In that context, the choice of A is suspicious on its face. But 
matters become much worse if strategy A is, moreover, not equally, but actually 
less effective in achieving the stated pro-competitive goals; in that case suspicion 
may be replaced with outright incredulity. The choice of a less effective but more 
exclusionary alternative strongly suggests both the intent and implementation of 
an anticompetitive and consumer harming course of conduct that should attract 
serious scrutiny. 
 Third, enforcers may consider, as evidence of actionable exclusion, the 
“sacrifice” of profit or product quality so as to damage competitors. When a 
dominant firm degrades its own products so as to damage competitors, it is often 
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reasonably inferred that the goal of such conduct is not, in fact, innovation, but 
the maintenance of dominance. Here, Google is sacrificing quality and profits on 
its search platform to exclude rivals to its local product. Such sacrifices are often 
linked to a change in an existing course of dealing. 
The idea of a sacrifice in product quality or of profit has an important 
pedigree in competition law. In the European Commission case British Midland v. 
Aer Lingus11, for example, regulators were greatly concerned that Aer Lingus 
sacrificed a better product – the issuance of “interlined” airline tickets - for the 
evident purpose of slowing a rising competitor (British Midland). Commission 
Decision Id. At issue was an existing practice whereby the airlines, who shared a 
route, issued a ticket that would be honored by either airline. The Commission 
noted that the practice was both preferred by consumers and revenue generating 
for all involved. When Aer Lingus began to refuse to interline with British Midland, 
it concluded that the denial of interlining was intended to damage competition 
and would harm consumers. “A significant number of passengers consider the 
possibility to change tickets and organize complex journeys on a single ticket as 
necessary” wrote the Commission, and “a refusal to interline will have the effect 
of diverting many of these passengers away from the new entrant airline. In this 
respect, a refusal to interline affects in particular the well-informed business 
travellers who require fully flexible tickets and who make a disproportionately 
large contribution to the revenue of the new entrant.” Commission Decision Id. at 
40. 
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The basic premise of the sacrifice analysis is recognition that even though 
exclusionary conduct can be ambiguous in its effect on consumers, where the 
exclusion creates a demonstrably lower quality product it becomes inherently 
suspicious.12 The strategy has the consequence of both harming consumers and 
damaging a competitor, and as such, bearing resemblance to the conduct at 
issue here.  
6.2 As Applied 
 Our analysis and results suggest that Google’s implementation of 
universal search in the local category sets off warning signs, using any of the 
criteria just outlined.   It might be considered as a specific instance of naked 
exclusion, the neglect of a less restrictive alternative, or a sacrifice of product 
quality. That should lead enforcers to treat the implementation of universal 
search with suspicion. 
Naked exclusion is an appropriate conclusion if considering universal 
search not as a whole, but specific implementations. This paper demonstrates 
that, in local search, the effect of Google’s OneBox on consumers is clearly 
negative. There may be other examples, discoverable through further testing. It 
may be appropriate then, to consider implementations particularly those serving 
up non-fact-based information of universal search as harmful to both consumers 
and competitors as simply the exercise of naked exclusion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Among	  various	  American	  examples	  of	  such	  conduct	  are	  Allied	  Tube,	  discussed	  above,	  and	  Aspen	  
Skiing	  Co.	  v.	  Aspen	  Highlands	  Skiing	  Corp.,	  472	  U.S.	  585	  (1985),	  in	  which	  a	  dominant	  skiing	  company	  
in	  the	  Aspen	  area	  purposely	  destroys	  a	  previously	  popular	  “all	  mountain”	  pass	  for	  no	  reason	  other	  
than	  doing	  damage	  to	  its	  competitor.	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 Alternatively, one might choose to view universal search more broadly, 
and credit the instances where Universal Search does benefit consumers (such 
as its more rapid responses to inquiries for raw factual data). In that case 
Google’s implementation of universal search more readily fits within the category 
of forgoing more effective, less restrictive alternative in favor of a strategy that 
both does more to exclude competitors and less to serve users. As such, the test 
gives strong reason to suggest that Google is opportunistically deploying 
universal search to prevent any threats to the general search engine, at the 
expense of both competition and consumers. 
Third, it should not be difficult to conclude that Google, when it comes to 
local searches, is sacrificing product quality in the pursuit of the exclusion of its 
competitors. As demonstrated above, consumers actually preferred a universal 
search that includes both Google and its competitors, just as travelers preferred 
the interlined airline tickets. As such, just as in the Aer Lingus case, there is “no 
persuasive and legitimate business justification for its conduct.” Commission 
Decision Id. at 41. Nor, as the Commission has recognized, can Google’s desire 
to grow its own specialized search product competitors serve as a justification for 
the conduct. The “desire to avoid loss of market share … [does] not make this a 
legitimate response to new entry.” Commission Decision Id. 
 The statements tend to support the theory that Universal Search was at 
minimum a two-edged instrument. It has been, at times, deployed in a way that 
benefits consumers. But everything also points to the use of the same 
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instrument, in at least some areas, to exclude competitors at the expense of 
consumers. 
6.3 Remedies 
 Among the greatest challenges facing any antitrust analysis is the 
question of remedies. During the various investigations of Google, the challenge 
of finding a remedy has been repeatedly stressed.  
Marina Lao asserts, for example, that “the remedy for any incidental 
exclusionary effects of search ‘bias’ is that it is likely to do more harm than good.” 
(Lao 2013). In the following section we suggest that randomized controlled trials 
performed for this paper present a clear means for designing a remedy where 
Google can be shown to be degrading search for exclusionary purposes, and 
one that is based entirely on Google’s own operating algorithm. In other words, 
contrary to the assertions of Lao and others, there is no need for any third party 
assessment of Google’s search. 
 The remedy depends on the availability of Google’s PageRank algorithm, 
which provides a well-recognized gold-standard for assessing relevance. 
PageRank with its origins as an academic paper written by Google founders, 
provides the industry’s leading indicator of what is most relevant, and therefore 
most serving of user welfare, for a given search inquiry. The remedy would, in 
areas that Google has demonstrated exclusionary activity, enjoin Google to use 
its PageRank algorithm to populate its universal search results.  
 A few examples might make clear how this would work in practice, using 
“local” search as the subject, an area where Google has been widely accused of 
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exclusionary practices. Following a finding that Google, in fact, has market 
power, and uses that market power in an exclusionary manner through universal 
search, the firm might be enjoined as follows. For those searches which trigger 
its local “OneBox” result, the firm must henceforth use the results of its own 
PageRank algorithm to populate that OneBox, as opposed to arbitrarily 
populating the OneBox with its own properties. 
 This remedy would come very close to doing what, at least according to 
some analysts, Google is incentivized to do anyhow. Ratliff and Rubinfeld have 
argued that Google has natural reasons to include third-party content when it is 
better than that which Google itself can provide.13 If that is the case, which is 
true, then the harm to Google of listening to PageRank cannot be great, and 
indeed the remedy may make the product better, even if it makes Google more 
vulnerable to competition on the merits. This is, to be clear, the exact opposite of 
“do[ing] more harm than good.” Instead, the remedy, if adopted, could be 
expected to create a product better for consumers, at the expense of universal 
search as a barrier to entry.  
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Figure 1: Google Search Results for “Pancake” 
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Figure 7: Cross Validation Control and Treatment 
 
